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a b s t r a c t
We consider a problem of foraging where identical foragers, or predators, arrive as a stochastic Poisson
process on the same patch of resource. We provide effective formulas for the expected resource intake
of any of the agents, as a function of its rank, given their common functional response. We give a gen-
eral theory, both in finite and infinite horizon, and show two examples of applications to harvesting
a common under different assumptions about the resource dynamics and the functional response, and
an example of application on a model that fits, among others, a problem of evolution of fungal plant
parasites.
© 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The theory of foraging and predation has generally started with
the investigation of the behavior of a lone forager [3,15] or of an
infinite population of identical foragers, investigating the effect of
direct competition [18,19,28] or their spatial distribution [7,16,17].
Then, authors investigated fixed finite groups of foragers in the
concept of “group foraging” [4,8,9].
This article belongs to a fourth family where one considers for-
agers arriving as a random process. Therefore, there are a finite
number of them at each time instant, but this number is varying
with time (increasing), and a priori unbounded. We use a Pois-
son process as a model of random arrivals. Poisson processes have
been commonly used in ecology as a model of encounters, either
of a resource by individual foragers, or of other individuals [1,26].
However, our emphasis is on foragers (or predators) arriving on a
given resource. There do not seem to be many examples of such
setups in the existing literature. Some can be found, e.g. in [10–
12], and also [29] (mainly devoted to wireless communications, but
with motivations also in ecology).
In [11], the authors consider the effect of the possibility of ar-
rival of a single other player at a random time on the optimal
diet selection of a forager. In [10,12], the authors consider an a
priori unbounded series of arrivals of identical foragers, focusing
on the patch leaving strategy. In these articles, the intake rate as
a function of the number of foragers —or functional response— is
∗ Corresponding author.
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within a given family, depending on the density of resource left on
the patch and on the number of foragers (and, in [12] on a scalar
parameter summarizing the level of interference between the for-
agers). And because the focus is on patch leaving strategies, one
only has to compare the current intake rate with an expected rate
in the environment, averaged over the equiprobable ranks of ar-
rival on future patches.
In the current article, we also consider an a priori unbounded
series of random arrivals of identical foragers, but we focus on the
expected harvest of each forager, as a function of its rank and ar-
rival time. Our aim is to give practical means of computing them,
either through closed formulas or through efficient numerical algo-
rithms. These expressions may later be used in foraging theory, e.g.
in the investigation of patch leaving strategies or of joining strate-
gies [25].
In Section 2, we first propose a rather general theory where
the intake rate is an arbitrary function of the state of the system.
All foragers being considered identical, this state is completely de-
scribed by the past sequence of arrivals and current time.
In Section 3, we offer three particular cases with specific re-
source depletion rates and functional responses, all in the case of
“scramble competition” (see [10]). But there is no a priori obstruc-
tion to dealing also with interference. The limitation, as we shall
see, is in the complexity of the dynamic equation we can deal
with.
We only consider the case of a Poisson process of arrivals, mak-
ing the harvesting process of any player a Piecewise Determin-
istic Markov Process (PDMP). Such processes have been investi-
gated in the engineering literature, since [27] and [24] at least. As
far as we know, the term PDMP (and even PDMDP for Piecewise
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.mbs.2016.01.004
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Deterministic Markov Decision Process, but we have no decision
here) was first introduced in [5]. Their control, the decision part,
was further investigated, in e.g. [6,31] and a wealth of literature.
Later articles such as [2,13] have concentrated on asymptotic prop-
erties of their optimal trajectories, and applications in manufactur-
ing systems.
These articles (except [5] who proposes general tools for PDMP
parallel to those available for diffusion processes) focus on ex-
istence and characterization of optimal control strategies. When
they give means of calculating the resulting expected payoff, it is
through a large (here infinite) set of coupled Hamilton–Jacobi (hy-
perbolic) partial differential equations. Here, we want to focus our
attention on the problem of evaluating this payoff when the intake
rates, the equivalent of strategy profiles of the control and games
literature, for each number of players present on the common, are
given; typically a known functional response. We take advantage
of the very simple structure of the underlying jump process (dis-
cussed below), and of the continuous dynamics we have, to obtain
closed form, or at least numerically efficient, expressions for the
expected payoff, which we call Value for brevity.
2. General theory
2.1. Notation
Data: t1, T, λ, {Lm(·, ·) , m ∈ N}.
Result sought Vn(·), n ∈ N.
t1 ∈ R Beginning of the first forager’s activity.
T ∈ (t1, ∞] Time horizon, either finite or infinite.
t ∈ [t1, T] Current time.
m(t) ∈ N Number of foragers present at time t.
tm Arrival time of the mth forager. (A Poisson pro-
cess.)
τm Sequence (t2, t3, . . . tm) of past arrival times.
Tm(t) ⊂ Rm−1 Set of consistent τm(t): {(τm|t1 < t2!!! < tm ≤ t}.
λ ∈ R+ Intensity of the Poisson process of arrivals.
δ ∈ R+ Actualization factor (intensity of the random
death process).
Lm(τm, t) ∈ R+ Intake rate of all foragers when they are m on the
common.
Mm(t) ∈ R+ Sum of all possible Lm(t), for all possible τm ∈
Tm(t).
Jm(τm) Reward of forager with arrival rank m, given the
sequence τm of past arrival times. (A random vari-
able.)
V1 ∈ R+ First forager’s expected reward.
Vm(τm) ∈ R+ Expected reward of the forager of rank m.
J(n)m (τm) Reward of player m if the total number of arriving
foragers is bounded by n. (Random variable)
V (n)m (τm) ∈ R+ Expectation of J(n)m (τm).
2.2. Statement of the problem
We aim to compute the expected harvest of foragers arriving
at random, as a Poisson process, on a resource that they somehow
have to share with the other foragers, both those already arrived
and those that could possibly arrive later. At this stage, we want
to let the process of resource depletion and foraging efficiency be
arbitrary. We shall specify them in the examples of Section 3.
2.2.1. Basic notation
We assume that there is a single player at initial time t1.
Whether t1 is fixed or random will be discussed shortly. At this
stage, we let it be a parameter of the problem considered. Then
identical players arrive as a Poisson process of intensity λ, player
number m arriving at time tm. The state of the system, (if t1 is
fixed) is entirely characterized by the current time t, the current
number of foragers arrived m(t), and the past sequence of arrival
times that we call τm(t):
∀m ≥ 2 , τm := (t2, t3, . . . , tm),
a random vector. The intake rate of any forager at time t is there-
fore a function Lm(t)(τm(t), t).
Let the horizon be T, finite or infinite. We may just write the
payoff of the first player as
J1(t1) =
∫ T
t1
e−δ(t−t1)Lm(t)(t2, . . . , tm(t), t)dt .
(We will often omit the index 1 and the argument t1 of J1 or V1.)
We shall also be interested in the payoff of the nth player arrived:
Jn(τn) =
∫ T
tn
e−δ(t−tn)Lm(t)(τm(t), t)dt .
(We shall often, in such formulas as above, write m for m(t) when
no ambiguity results.) The exponential actualization exp(−δt) will
be discussed shortly. We always assume δ ≥ 0. In the finite horizon
problem, it may, at will, be set to δ = 0.
2.2.2. Initial time t1
In all our examples, the functions Lm(τm, t) only depend on
time through differences t − t1, or t − tm, tm − tm−1, . . . t2 − t1. They
are shift invariant. We believe that this will be the case of most
applications one would think of. In such cases, the results are in-
dependent of t1. Therefore, there is no point in making it random.
If, to the contrary, the time of the day, say, or the time of the
year, enters into the intake rate, then it makes sense to consider t1
as a random variable. One should then specify its law, may be ex-
ponential with the same coefficient λ, making it the first event of
the Poisson process. In this case, our formulas actually depend on
t1, and the various payoff Vn should be taken as the expectations
of these formulas.
One notationally un-natural way of achieving this is to keep the
same formulas as below (in the finite horizon case), let t1 = 0, and
decide that, for all m ≥ 2, tm is the arrival time of the forager
number m− 1. A more natural way is to shift all indices by one,
i.e. keep the same formulas, again with t1 = 0, and decide that
τm := (t1, t2, . . . , tm), and Tm(t) = {τm | 0 < t1 < · · · < tm ≤ t}.
2.2.3. Horizon T
The simplicity of the underlying Markov process in our Markov
Piecewise Deterministic Process stems from the fact that we do not
let foragers leave the resource before T once they have joined. The
main reason for that is based upon standard results of foraging
theory that predict that all foragers should leave simultaneously,
when their common intake rate drops below a given threshold.
(See [3,10,12].)
When considering the infinite horizon case, we shall systemat-
ically assume that the system is shift invariant, and, for simplicity,
let t1 = 0. A significant achievement of its investigation is in giv-
ing the conditions under which the criterion converges, i.e. how it
behaves for a very long horizon. Central in that question is the ex-
ponential actualization factor. As is well known, it accounts for the
case where the horizon is not actually infinite, but where termi-
nation will happen at an unknown time, a random horizon with
an exponential law of coefficient δ. It has the nice feature to let
a bounded revenue stream give a bounded pay-off. Without this
discount factor, the integral cost might easily be undefined. In that
respect, we just offer the following remark:
Proposition 1. If there exists a sequence of positive numbers {$m}
such that the infinite series %m$m converges, and the sequence of
functions {Lm(·)} satisfies a growth condition
∀m ∈ N , ∀ sequences (t2, t3, . . . , tm, t) , |Lm(t2 . . . , tm, t)| ≤ $m ,
P. Bernhard, F. Hamelin /Mathematical Biosciences 273 (2016) 91–101 93
then the infinite horizon integral converges even with δ = 0.
As a matter of fact, we then have
|J1| ≤
∫ ∞
0
|Lm(t)|dt ≤
∫ ∞
0
$m(t)dt =
∞∑
m=1
(tm+1 − tm)$m ,
and hence
EJ1 ≤ 1λ
∞∑
m=1
$m ,
ensuring the convergence of the integral. (Notice however that this
is not satisfied by the first two examples below, and not an issue
for the third.)
2.2.4. Further notation
We will need the following notation:
∀m ≥ 2 , Tm(t) = {τm ∈ Rm−1 | t1 < t2 < · · · < tm ≤ t} ,
(a better notation would be Tm(t1, t), but we omit t1 for simplicity)
and
M1(t) = L1(t) , ∀m ≥ 2 , Mm(t) =
∫
Tm(t)
Lm(τm, t)dτm . (1)
More explicitly, we can write, for example
M3(t) =
∫ T
t1
dt2
∫ T
t2
dt3
∫ T
t3
L3(t2, t3, t)dt
=
∫ T
t1
dt
∫ t
t1
dt3
∫ t3
t1
L(t2, t3, t)dt2.
These Mm(t) are deterministic functions, which will be seen to suf-
ficiently summarize the Lm(τm, t), a huge simplification in terms
of volume of data. The explanation of their appearance is in the
fact that once t and m(t) are given, all sequences τm ∈ Tm(t) are
equiprobable. That is why only their sum comes into play. It will
be weighted by the probability that that particular m(t) happens.
To give a precise meaning to this notation, we make the fol-
lowing assumption, where Tm(t) stands for the closure of the set
Tm(t):
Assumption 1. Let Dm be the domain {(t, τm) ∈ R× Rm−1 | τm ∈
Tm(t)}. ∀m ∈ N\{1}, the functions Lm( ·, ·) are continuous from Dm
to R.
As a consequence, the fact that Mm be defined as an integral
over a non-closed domain is harmless. For integration purposes,
we may take the closure of Tm. This also implies that each of the
Lm( ·, t) is bounded. Concerning the bounds, we give two defini-
tions:
Definition 1.
1. The sequence of functions {Lm} is said to be uniformly bounded
by L if
∃L > 0 : ∀t > t1 ,∀m ∈ N ,∀τm ∈ Tm(t) , |Lm(τm, t)| ≤ L .
2. The sequence of functions Lm is said to be exponentially bounded
by L if
∃L > 0 : ∀t > t1 ,∀m ∈ N ,∀τm ∈ Tm(t) , |Lm(τm, t)| ≤ Lm .
Remark 1.
1. If the sequence {Lm} is uniformly bounded by L, it is also expo-
nentially bounded by max {L, 1}.
2. If the sequence is exponentially bounded by L ≤ 1, it is also
uniformly bounded by L.
2.3. Computing the Value
2.3.1. Finite horizon
We consider the problem with finite horizon T, and let V1 be its
value, i.e. the first forager’s expected payoff. We aim to prove the
following fact:
Theorem 1. If the sequence {Lm} is exponentially bounded, then, the
Value V1 = EJ1 is given by
V1 =
∫ T
t1
e−(λ+δ)(t−t1)
∞∑
m=1
λm−1Mm(t)dt . (2)
Proof. We consider the same game, but where the maximum
number n of players that may arrive is known. In this game, let
J(n)m (τm) be the payoff of the problem starting at the time tm of ar-
rival of the mth player, and V (n)m (τm) be its conditional expectation
given τm. We have for m < n:
J(n)m (τm) =

∫ tm+1
tm
e−δ(t−tm)Lm(τm, t)dt
+e−δ(tm+1−tm)J(n)m+1(τm, tm+1) if tm+1 < T ,∫ T
tm
e−δ(t−tm)Lm(τm, t)dt if tm < T < tm+1 ,
0 if tm ≥ T .
(3)
and
V (n)n (τn) = J(n)n (τn) =
{∫ T
tn
e−δ(t−tn)Ln(τn, t)dt if tn < T ,
0 if tn ≥ T .
We now perform a calculation analogous to that in [11]. We want
to evaluate the conditional expectation of J(n)m , given τm. The ran-
dom variables involved in this expectation are the tk for k ≥ m+ 1.
We isolate the variable tm+1, with the exponential law of tm+1 − tm.
Because of the formula (3), we must distinguish the case where
tm+1 ≤ T from the case where tm+1 > T, which happens with a
probability exp(−λ(T − tm)). As for the tk with higher indices
k, we use the definition of the expectation given (τm, tm+1) as
EJ(n)m+1(τm, tm+1) = V (n)m+1(tm, tm+1). We get
V (n)m (τm) =
∫ T
tm
λe−λ(tm+1−tm)
[∫ tm+1
tm
e−δ(t−tm)Lm(τm, t)dt
+e−δ(tm+1−tm)V (n)m+1(τm, tm+1)
]
dtm+1
+e−λ(T−tm)
∫ T
tm
e−δ(t−tm)Lm(τm, t)dt .
Using Fubini’s theorem, we get
V (n)m (τm) =
∫ T
tm
[∫ T
t
λe−λ(tm+1−tm)dtm+1
]
e−δ(t−tm)Lm(τm, t)dt
+
∫ T
tm
λe−(λ+δ)(tm+1−tm)V (n)m+1(τm, tm+1)dtm+1
+e−λ(T−tm)
∫ T
tm
e−δ(t−tm)Lm(tm, t)dt.
The inner integral in the first line above integrates explicitly, and
its upper bound exactly cancels the last term in the last line. We
also change the name of the integration variable of the second line
from tm+1 to t. We are left with
V (n)m (τm) =
∫ T
tm
e−(λ+δ)(t−tm)
[
Lm(τm, t)+ λV (n)m+1(τm, t)
]
dt . (4)
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We may now substitute formula (4) for V (3)2 in the same formula
for V (3)1 :
V (3)1 (t2, t3) =
∫ T
t1
e−(λ+δ)(t2−t1)
[
L1(t2)+ λ
∫ T
t2
e−(λ+δ)(t3−t2)
×
(
L2(t2, t3)+ λ
∫ T
t3
L3(t2, t3, t)dt
)
dt3
]
dt2 .
Using again Fubini’s theorem, we get
V (3)1 (t2, t3)=
∫ T
t1
e−(λ+δ)(t−t1)L1(t)dt
+ λ
∫ T
t1
e−(λ+δ)(t−t1)
(∫ t
t1
L2(t2, t)dt2
)
dt
+ λ2
∫ T
t1
[∫ t
t1
(∫ t
t2
e−(λ+δ)(t3−t1)L3(t1, t2, t3, t)dt3
)
dt2
]
dt
We may now extend the same type of calculation to V (n)1 . We
find
V (n)1 =
n−1∑
m=1
λm−1
∫ T
t1
e−(λ+δ)(t−t1)Mm(t)dt + λn−1
×
∫ T
t1
∫
Tn(t)
e−(λ+δ)(tn−t1)Ln(τn, t)dτn dt, (5)
or, equivalently, let
∀m < n , M(n)m = Mm , M(n)n (t) =
∫
Tn(t)
e(λ+δ)(t−tn)Ln(τn, t)dτn ,
(6)
V (n)1 =
n∑
m=1
λm−1
∫ T
t1
e−(λ+δ)(t−t1)M(n)m (t)dτn .
Now, if the sequence {Lm} is exponentially, respectively uniformly,
bounded by L (see Definition (1)), we get
|Mm(t)| ≤ (t − t1)
m−1
(m− 1)! L
m, resp |Mm(t)| ≤ (t − t1)
m−1
(m− 1)! L, (7)
and the last integral over Tn(t) in Eq. (5) is a fortiori less in ab-
solute value than |Mn(t)|, since Lm is multiplied by a factor less
than 1.
We can now take the limit as n → ∞. For each finite n, we have
a sum Sn. Call S′n the sum without the last term. The sum in (2) is
limn→∞ S′n. Because of the remark above Sn − S′n → 0 as n → ∞.
Hence Sn and S′n have the same limit as n → ∞. Moreover, the es-
timation of Mm(t) above implies that the series in Eq. (2) converges
absolutely. Therefore the theorem is proved. !
Corollary 1.
• If the sequence {Lm} is exponentially bounded by L, then
|V1|≤ Lλ(L− 1)− δ
[
e[λ(L−1)−δ](T−t1) − 1
]
, i f λ(L−1)−δ -= 0,
|V1|≤ (T − t1)L i f λ(L−1)−δ=0.
• If the sequence {Lm} is uniformly bounded by L, then
|V1| ≤ Lδ (e
−δ(t−t1) − 1) i f δ -= 0 ,
|V1| ≤ L(T − t1) , i f δ = 0 .
• The above two inequalities become equalities if Lm is constant
equal to L.
It is worth mentioning that this also yields the value Vm(τm)
for the mth player arriving at time tm given the whole sequence of
past arrival times τm. We need extra notation:
∀n ≥ m , τ nm = (tm+1, . . . , tn) , τn = (τm, τ nm) ,
T nm (tm, t) = {τ nm | tm ≤ tm+1 ≤ . . . ≤ tn ≤ t},
and
Mnn(τn, t) = Ln(τn, t) , ∀n > m , Mnm(τm, t)
=
∫
τ nm∈T nm (tm,t)
Ln(τm, τ nm, t)dτ
n
m.
Corollary 2. The value of the mth arriving player given the past se-
quence τm of arrival times is
Vm(τm) =
∫ T
tm
e−(λ+δ)(t−tm)
∞∑
k=m
λk−mMkm(τm, t)dt .
2.3.2. Infinite horizon
We now tackle the problem of estimating the expectation of
J1 =
∫ ∞
0
e−δt Lm(t)(τm, t)dt .
(We have in mind a stationary problem, hence the choice of initial
time 0). We will prove the following fact:
Theorem 2. If the sequence {Lm} is uniformly bounded, or if it is ex-
ponentially bounded by L, and δ > λ(L− 1), then the expectation V1
of J1 is given by
V1 =
∫ ∞
0
e−(λ+δ)t
∞∑
m=1
λm−1Mm(t)dt . (8)
Remark 2. If the sequence {Lm} is exponentially bounded with L
≤ 1, the condition δ > λ(L− 1) is automatically satisfied (and it is
also uniformly bounded).
Proof. We start from the formula (2), set t1 = 0, and denote the
value with a superindex (T) to note the finite horizon. This yields
V (T )1 =
∫ T
0
e−(δ+λ)t
∞∑
m=1
λm−1Mm(t)dt . (9)
We only have now to check whether the integral converges as T →
∞. We use then the bounds (7), which show that
• If the sequence {Lm} is exponentially bounded,∣∣∣∣∣ ∞∑
m=1
λm−1Mm(t)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ LeλLt ,
• If the sequence {Lm} is uniformly bounded ,∣∣∣∣∣ ∞∑
m=1
λm−1Mm(t)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ Leλt .
As a consequence, the integral in formula (9) converges as T →
∞, always if the {Lm} are uniformly bounded, and if λ(L− 1)− δ <
0 if they are exponentially bounded. !
Corollary 3. If the sequence {Lm} is exponentially bounded and δ >
λ(L− 1), then
|V1| ≤ Lδ − λ(L− 1) ,
if the sequence {Lm} is uniformly bounded and δ > 0, then
|V1| ≤ Lδ ,
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Fig. 1. The decrease of V1 as λ goes from 0 to 5 in the simple sharing problem, for
a = 1, T − t1 = 5 and δ = 0.
if the Lm are constant and Lm(τm, t) = L, then
V1 = Lδ .
We also get the corresponding corollary:
Corollary 4. The expected payoff of the mth arriving player given the
past sequence τm of arrival times is:
Vm(τm) =
∫ ∞
tm
e−(λ+δ)(t−tm)
∞∑
k=m
λk−mMkm(τm, t)dt . (10)
3. Some examples
3.1. Simple sharing
3.1.1. The problem
In this very simple application, we assume that a flux of the
desirable good of a units per time unit is available, say a renewable
resource that regenerates at the constant rate of a units per time
unit, and the foragers present just share it equally. This example
may fit biotrophic fungal plant parasites such as cereal rusts (see
Appendix B).
3.1.2. The Value
Finite horizon. Thus, in this model (which is not accounted for by
our theory [10]),
∀t , ∀m , ∀τm ∈ Tm(t) , Lm(τm, t) = a
m
.
It follows that, in the finite horizon case,
Mm(t) = a (t − t1)
m−1
m!
.
Hence,
V1 = a
∫ T
t1
e−(λ+δ)(t−t1)
∞∑
m=1
λm−1(t − t1)m−1
m!
= a
∫ T
t1
e−(λ+δ)(t−t1)
λ(t − t1)
(
eλ(t−t1) − 1
)
dt.
We immediately conclude:
Theorem 3. For the simple sharing problem in finite horizon, the
value is
V1 = a
∫ T−t1
0
e−δt
1− e−λt
λt
dt . (11)
We show in Fig. 1a graph of V1 for a = 1, T = 5 and δ = 0 as
a function of λ, for λ ∈ [0, 5]. The integral was computed on a
spreadsheet by the method of trapezes with a time step of .01.
Infinite horizon. In infinite horizon, we may further use the
identity∫ ∞
0
e−(λ+δ)t
tm−1
(m− 1)! dt =
1
(λ+ δ)m
easily derived by successive integrations by parts. This immediately
yields
V1 = a
∞∑
m=1
λm−1
m(λ+ δ)m .
We rearrange this expression as
V1 = aλ
∞∑
m=1
1
m
(
1
1+ δλ
)m
.
Now, we use the identity, valid for x ∈ (0, 1),
∞∑
m=1
xm
m
= − ln(1− x)
to obtain the following result:
Theorem 4. For the simple sharing problem in infinite horizon, the
Value is
V1 = aλ ln
(
1+ λ
δ
)
. (12)
One can offer the following remarks:
Remark 3.
• As expected, when λ→ 0, V1 → a/δ, and V1 → 0 when λ → ∞.
• The derivative of V1 with respect to λ is always negative, in-
creasing from −a/2δ2 for λ = 0 to 0 as λ → ∞.
• V1 is decreasing with δ, but diverges to infinity as δ → 0.
Finally, we get
Corollary 5. For the simple sharing problem in infinite horizon, the
expected payoff of the mth forager arrived is
Vm = aλ
(
1+ δ
λ
)m−1 ∞∑
k=m
1
k
(
λ
λ+ δ
)k
= a
λ
(
1+ δ
λ
)m−1[
ln
(
1+ λ
δ
)
−
m−1∑
k=1
1
k
(
1+ δ
λ
)−k]
. (13)
A more general formula. At this stage, we have no explicit formula
for the mth arrived forager, m > 1, in finite horizon. We give now
two formulas, whose derivations can be found in A.1:
Theorem 5. For the simple sharing problem with horizon T, the ex-
pected reward of the mth arrived forager is given by any of the fol-
lowing formulas :
V (T )m (tm) =
a
λ+ δ e
−(λ+δ)(T−tm)
∞∑
$=1
(λ+ δ)$(T − tm)$
$!
×
$−1∑
k=0
1
k+m
(
1+ δ
λ
)−k
. (14)
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or
V (T )m (tm) =
a
λ
(
1+ δ
λ
)m−1[
ln
(
1+ λ
δ
)
−
m−1∑
k=1
1
k
(
1+ δ
λ
)−k]
− a
λ+ δ e
−(λ+δ)(T−tm)
∞∑
k=0
1
k+m
(
1+ δ
λ
)−k
×
k∑
$=0
(λ+ δ)$(T − tm)$
$!
. (15)
The first formula is easier to use for numerical computations,
but the second one has the following properties:
Remark 4.
• The second term in the bracket of the first line cancels for m =
1, giving an alternate formula for V1 to (11), (but probably less
useful numerically),
• the second line goes to 0 as T → ∞, allowing one to recover
formulas (13) and, combining the two remarks (12).
3.2. Harvesting a common: functional response of type 1
3.2.1. Notation
Beyond the notation of the general theory, we have:
x(t) ∈ R+ Available resource at time t.
x1 ∈ R+ Initial amount of resource in the finite horizon
problem.
x0 ∈ R+ Initial amount of resource in the infinite horizon
problem.
a ∈ R+ Relative intake rate of all foragers: rate = ax.
b ∈ R+ Relative renewal rate of the resource.
c ∈ R+ c = b/a: if m > c, the resource goes down.
µ ∈ R+ µ = λ/a a dimensionless measure of λ.
δ ∈ R+ Discount factor for the infinite horizon problem.
ν ∈ R+ ν = δ/a. A dimensionless measure of δ.
σm σm =∑mk=1 tk. A real random variable.
3.2.2. The problem
We consider a resource x which has a “natural” growth rate b,
(which may be taken equal to zero if desired), and decreases as it
is harvested by the foragers. Each forager harvests a quantity ax of
the resource per time unit. This is a functional response of type
1 in Holling’s classification (see [15]), or “proportional harvesting”,
or “fixed effort harvesting” [23]. Assuming that this functional re-
sponse does not change with predators density (no interference),
we have
∀t ∈ (tm, tm+1) , x˙ = (b−ma)x , x(t1) = x1 .
3.2.3. Finite horizon
We begin with a finite horizon T and the payoff
J1 =
∫ T
t1
ax(t)dt .
Define
σm =
m∑
k=1
tk . (16)
With respect to the above theory, we have here
Lm(τm, t) = ae(b−ma)(t−tm)e[b−(m−1)a](tm−tm−1) · · · e(b−a)(t2−t1)x1
= aeb(t−t1)e−a(mt−σm)x1 .
A more useful representation for our purpose is
Lm(τm, t) = e(b−ma)(t−tm)Lm−1(τm−1, tm) .
It follows that
Mm(t) =
∫ t
t1
e(b−ma)(t−tm)Mm−1(tm)dtm, M1(t) = ae(b−a)(t−t1)x1.
(17)
Lemma 1. The solution of the recursion (17) is
Mm(t) = ae
(b−a)(t−t1)
(m− 1)!
(
1− e−a(t−t1)
a
)m−1
x1 . (18)
Proof. Notice first that the formula is correct for M1(t) =
a exp[(b− a)(t − t1)]x1. From Eq. (17), we derive an alternate re-
cursion:
d
dt
Mm+1(t) = [b− (m+ 1)a]Mm+1(t)+Mm(t) , Mm+1(t1) = 0 .
It is a simple matter to check that the formula derived from (18)
for Mm+1:
Mm+1(t) = ae
(b−a)(t−t1)
m!
(
1− e−a(t−t1)
a
)m
x1
together with (18) does satisfy that recursion. !
From the above lemma, we derive the following:
Corollary 6. For the proportional foraging game, we have
∞∑
m=1
λm−1Mm(t) = a exp
[
(b− a)(t − t1)+ λ
a
(1− e−a(t−t1))
]
x1.
Substituting this result in (2), we obtain:
Theorem 6. The value of the finite horizon proportional harvesting
problem is as follows: let
b
a
= c , λ
a
= µ,
then
V1 = aeµ
∫ T
t1
exp[(c−µ− 1)a(t − t1)−µe−a(t−t1)] dt x1 .
or equivalently
V1 = eµ
∞∑
k=0
(−µ)k
k!
1
µ− c+ k+ 1
(
1− e−(µ−c+k+1)a(T−t1)
)
x1 . (19)
Proof. It remains only to derive the alternate, second, formula. It
is obtained by expanding exp[(−µ exp(−a(t − t1))] into its power
series expansion to obtain
V1 = aeµ
∞∑
k=0
(−µ)k
k!
∫ T
t1
e(c−µ−k−1)a(t−t1)d t x1
and integrate each term. !
Remark 5. Remark that, although it looks awkward, formula (19)
is numerically efficient, as, an alternating exponential-like series, it
converges very quickly.
3.2.4. Infinite horizon
It is easy to derive from there the infinite horizon case with the
same dynamics, x(0) = x0, and
J1 = a
∫ ∞
0
e−δtx(t)dt .
Theorem 7. The Value of the infinite horizon proportional harvest-
ing problem is finite if and only if δ > b− a− λ. In that case it is as
follows: let
b
a
= c , λ
a
= µ, δ
a
= ν ,
P. Bernhard, F. Hamelin /Mathematical Biosciences 273 (2016) 91–101 97
Fig. 2. The decrease of V1 as λ increases, here as a function of µ = λ/a, for the
infinite horizon proportional foraging problem. c = 2, ν = 1, x0 = 1.
then
V1 = aeµ
∫ ∞
0
exp[(c−µ− ν − 1)at −µe−at ] dt x0 ,
or equivalently
V1 = eµ
∞∑
k=0
(−µ)k
k!
1
µ+ ν − c+ k+ 1 x0 (20)
or equivalently
V1 = eµ
∫ 1
0
zµ+ν−ce−µzdz x0 . (21)
Proof. The first formula above is obtained by carrying the integra-
tion from 0 to ∞ instead of from t1 to T. The second formula fol-
lows as in the finite horizon case, and the third one, numerically
more useful, is obtained by considering the function
F (z) = eµ
∞∑
k=0
(−µ)k
k!
zµ+ν−c+k+1
µ+ ν − c+ k+ 1 x0 , (22)
Clearly, F (1) = V1. Moreover, the condition of the theorem that
δ > b− a− λ translates into µ+ ν − c+ 1 > 0, so that all powers
of z in F(z) are positive, and hence F (0) = 0. Now, differentiate the
terms of the series, to obtain
eµzµ+ν−c
∞∑
k=0
(−µz)k
k!
= eµzµ+ν−ce−µz .
This is always a convergent series. Hence it represents the deriva-
tive F′(z) of F(z). As a consequence, we have
V1 =
∫ 1
0
F ′(z)dz = eµ
∫ 1
0
zµ+ν−ce−µzdz x0 .
!
If µ+ ν − c happens to be a positive integer, a very unlikely
fact in any real application, successive integrations by parts yield a
closed form expression for the integral formula (21).
Remark 6. Clearly, the same remark as in the finite horizon case
holds for formula (20). Formula (21) is even numerically easier
to implement. A slight difficulty appears if µ+ ν − c < 0. Remem-
ber, though, that it must anyhow be larger than −1. In that case,
F ′(0) =∞. One may integrate from a small value z0, using the first
term of the series (22), F (z0) . eµzµ+ν−c+10 , as a good approxima-
tion of F.
We show in Fig. 2a graph of V1 as a function of µ, for µ ∈ [1,
6], for the infinite horizon problem, obtained with formula (21), for
c = 2, ν = 1, x0 = 1. The integral was computed on a spreadsheet,
with the formula of trapezes, with a step size of .01.
3.3. Harvesting a common: functional response of type 2
3.3.1. Notation
Beyond the notation of the general theory, we have:
x ∈ R+ Available resource.
x1 ∈ R+ Initial amount of resource.
a ∈ R+ Coefficient of the intake rate.
α ∈ (0, 1) Power parameter of the intake rate = ax1−α .
p = 1α −1 Other parametrization of α = 1/(1+ p).
h ∈ R+ Duration until exhaustion of the resource if the first
forager remains alone.
q ∈ R− Logarithm of the probability that the first forager re-
main alone until exhaustion of the resource.
3.3.2. A family of concave functional responses
In this example, we assume a non renewable resource, and
foragers or predators with a concave functional response. Specif-
ically, if the resource amount is x, the intake rate of a forager
is assumed to be ax(1−α), α ∈ (0, 1). This provides us with a
one-parameter family1 of concave functional responses resembling
Holling’s type 2. By contrast to the laws most commonly used,
such as the Michaelis–Menten harmonic law ax/(1+ hax) [23], and
to the curves shown by Holling [15], they lack a plateau at large
densities. A distinctive feature is their vertical tangent (infinite
derivative) at the origin.2 It has the nice consequence that it makes
the resource go to zero in finite time, certainly a more realistic
feature than an infinite tail with very low resource left, mainly so
if the resource is discrete (number of hosts parasitized, of preys
eaten, ...).3 This makes the problem naturally with a finite horizon,
and limits to a very small number the probability of having a very
large number of foragers participating, although it is not bounded
a priori.4
In short, our model is
• less realistic than the harmonic law at high prey densities,
• more realistic than the harmonic law at small and vanishing
prey densities.
We therefore have:
∀t ∈ [tm, tm+1] , x˙ = −max1−α , x(t1) = x1 . (23)
The dynamics (23) immediately integrate into: ∀t ∈ [tm, tm+1],
xα(t) =

xα(tm)− αam(t − tm) if t ≤ x
α(tm)
αam
+ tm ,
0 if t ≥ x
α(tm)
αam
+ tm .
(24)
Applying this to the first stage m = 1, we are led to introduce the
two parameters
h = x
α
1
αa
and q = −λh (25)
which are respectively the maximum possible duration of the har-
vesting activity, assuming a lone forager, and the logarithm of the
probability that the first forager be actually left alone during that
time. We also introduce two more useful quantities:
p = 1
α
− 1 ,
1 The parameter a amounts to a simple rescaling of time. The notation x1−α was
preferred to xα because it simplifies later calculations.
2 Holling [15] does not give explicit mathematical formulas for the various func-
tional responses. But we notice that in his Fig. 8, he seems to show a vertical tan-
gent at the origin for type 2.
3 This avoids the paradox of the “atto fox” [20].
4 A somewhat unpleasant consequence of this law is that, if the dimension of the
resource x is X, the dimension of a is XαT−1.
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so that α = 1/(1+ p), and
∀r ∈ R+ , ∀$ ∈ N, $ ≥ 2 , Pr(1) = 1 , Pr($) =
$−1∏
i=1
(r + i) . (26)
3.3.3. Expected reward
With these notation we can state the following fact, whose
proof is given in A.2.
Theorem 8. For the problem of harvesting a nonrenewable resource
with a functional response L(x) = axp/(p+1), p a positive real number,
using q the natural logarithm of the probability that the first forager
remains alone until exhaustion of the resource, and notation (26),
Vm+1 = xm+1
∞∑
$=1
q$−1
Pp+1($)
$∑
n=1
(−1)$−n
($− n)!
n∑
k=1
1
k!(m+ k)n−k . (27)
Remark 7. Several remarks are in order.
• The expected reward of the first forager is therefore obtained
by placing m = 0 in the above formula.
• The first term of the power series in q is just 1. Therefore this
could be written
V1 = x1[1+ qS]
where S is a power series in q. We therefore find that if no
other forager may come, i.e. λ = 0, hence q = 0, we recover
V1 = x1: the lone forager gets all the resource. And since q <
0, V1 is less than x1 as soon as q -= 0.
• The series converges, and even absolutely. As a matter of fact, it
is easy to see that the last two, finite, sums are less than (e2 +
1)/2. (Taking the sum of the positive terms only and extending
them to infinity.)
• The case p = 1 (i.e. α = 1/2) is somewhat simpler. In particular,
in that case, Pp($) = $!, and Pp+1($) = ($+ 1)!/2.
3.3.4. Numerical computation
We aim to show that, in spite of the unappealing aspect of our
formulas, they are indeed very easy to implement numerically. We
focus first on the payoff of the first player, i.e. formula (27) with
m = 0.
On the one hand, q being negative, it is an alternating series,
converging quickly: the absolute value of the remainder is less
than that of the first term neglected, and a fortiori than that of
the last term computed. Therefore it is easy to appreciate the pre-
cision of a numerical computation. The smaller the intensity λ of
the Poisson process of arrivals, the faster the series converges. On
the other hand, it lends itself to an easy numerical implementation
along the following scheme. Let
V1 = x1
∞∑
$=1
u$
$∑
n=1
v$−nwn , wn =
n∑
k=1
yn,k .
Obviously,
u$ = q
$−1
Pp+1($)
, vn = (−1)
n
n!
, yn,k =
1
k! kn−k
.
Therefore, the following recursive scheme is possible :
u1 = 1 , ∀$ > 1 , u$ = qu$−1
p+ $ ,
v0 = 1 , ∀n > 1 , vn = −vn−1
n
,
Fig. 3. The decrease of V1 as λ increases from 0 to 5 for the functional response of
type 2, with x1 = 1, a = 1, α = .5.
y1,1 = 1 , ∀n > 1 ,1 ≤ k < n , yn,k = yn−1,kk ,
∀n > 1 , yn,n = yn−1,n−1
n
.
The sequences {un}, {vn} and {wn} need be computed only once.
Altogether, if we want to compute L steps, there are 2L2 + 3(L− 1)
arithmetic operations to perform. A small task on a modern com-
puter even for L = a few hundreds. Moreover, given the factorials,
it seems unlikely that more than a few tens of coefficients be ever
necessary, as our limited numerical experiments show. In that re-
spect, the computational scheme we have proposed is adapted to
the case where |q| is large (λ large), lumping the numerator q$−1
with the denominator Pp+1($) —which is larger than $!— to avoid
multiplying a very large number by a very small one, a numeri-
cally ill behaved operation. For small |q| (say, no more than one),
one may compute a few coefficients of the power series separately,
and then use the polynomial to compute V1 for various values of q.
We show in Fig. 3a plot of V1 as a function of λ, for α = .5, a =
1 and x1 = 1. (i.e. a time to exhaustion of the resource for a lone
forager equal to two.) It was obtained using the recursive scheme
above (in Scilab). For the larger λ = 5, we needed 40 terms in the
infinite sum (which was also sufficient for λ = 6).
Finally, formula (27), giving the expected payoff of an agent
arriving when m other agents are present, can clearly be imple-
mented numerically along the same scheme as previously, replac-
ing yn,k = yn−1,k/k by yn,k = yn−1,k/(m+ k).
4. Conclusion
The problem considered here is only that of evaluating the ex-
pected reward of these identical agents arriving as a Poisson ran-
dom process. This seems to be a prerequisite to many problems
in foraging theory in that reasonably realistic framework, although
it was avoided in the investigation of the optimal patch leaving
strategies [10]. (Notice, however, that our first example is not ac-
counted for by that theory.) In that respect, we were able to build
a rather general theory, independent of the particular functional
response of the foragers and of the resource depletion/renewal
mechanism. A nice feature of the theory is that, while the com-
plete data of the problem involve the sequence of functions Lm(τm,
t), each a function of m real variables, a very large amount of data,
the result only depends on the sequence of functions of one real
variable Mm(t).
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Three particular examples, of increasing complexity, all three in
scramble competition (no interference), show that this general the-
ory can be particularized to more specific contexts, leading to ef-
ficient numerical algorithms, if not always to closed formulas. We
provide numerical results that do not claim to be representative of
any real situation, but are meant to show that the computation can
easily be performed, and to display the qualitative aspect of the re-
sults. The first two examples: simple, equal, sharing of a constant
flux of goods and proportional foraging of a (slowly) renewable re-
source, can easily be implemented on a spreadsheet. The example
with a functional response of Holling type 2 requires a small pro-
gram, that runs essentially instantly. In all three cases, the decrease
of V1 as λ increases look qualitatively similar.
However, we need, as in our examples, to be able to integrate
explicitly in closed form the dynamic equation of the resource to
compute the Mm sufficiently explicitly. This is why we chose the
particular functional response we proposed as an approximation
of a Holling type 2 response. Admittedly a major weakness of this
theory so far. What would be needed would be a theory exploit-
ing the simple, sequential nature of the Markov process at hand,
but not dependent on an explicit integration of the differential dy-
namics. An open problem at this stage.
Also, we are far from determining any kind of optimal behavior,
such as diet choice as in [11]. But this study was a first necessary
step in characterizing the efficiency of the foraging process. Since
we have the result for each number of agents present upon join-
ing, it may be useful to decide whether an individual should join
[25]. Other exciting possibilities for future research include explor-
ing further the Simple sharing example, which may provide origi-
nal insights as to the evolution of the latent period in plant para-
sites (Appendix B).
Appendix A. Proofs
A.1. Proof of Theorem 5
We aim to derive formulas (14) and (15). We shall simplify the
notation through the use of
α := λ+ δ , and θ := T − tm .
We start from
Vm = a
∫ T
tm
e−αθ
∞∑
k=m
λk−m(t − tm)k−m
k(k−m)! dt
= a
λm
∞∑
k=m
λk
k
∫ θ
0
e−αt
tk−m
(k−m)! dt .
Successive integrations by parts show that
∀n ∈ N ,
∫ θ
0
e−αt
tn
n!
= 1
αn+1
(
1− e−αθ
n∑
$=0
α$θ$
$!
)
.
Substitute this in the previous formula, to get
Vm = aα
m−1
λm
[
∞∑
k=m
λk
kαk
− e−αθ
∞∑
k=m
λk
kαk
k−m∑
$=0
α$θ$
$!
]
= aα
m−1
λm
[
∞∑
k=m
λk
kαk
− e−αθ
∞∑
$=0
α$θ$
$!
∞∑
k=$+m
λk
kαk
]
.
We use twice the identity
∀n ∈ N ,
∞∑
k=n
λk
kαk
= ln
(
1+ λ
δ
)
−
n−1∑
k=1
λk
kαk
.
The two terms ln(1+ λ/δ) cancel each other, and we are left with
Vm = aα
m−1
λm
[
−
m−1∑
k=1
λk
kαk
+ e−αθ
∞∑
$=0
α$θ$
$!
$+m−1∑
k=1
λk
kαk
]
.
We write the last sum over k as a sum from k = 1 to m− 1 plus
a sum from k = m to $+m− 1. The first one cancels with the first
sum in the square bracket, to yield
Vm = aα
m−1
λm
e−αθ
∞∑
$=1
α$θ$
$!
$+m−1∑
k=m
λk
hαk
.
It suffices to re-introduce the leading factor (α/λ)m−1 in the last
sum and to shift the summation index k by m to obtain for-
mula (14).
To obtain formula (15), interchange the order of summation in
the above double sum (all the series involved are absolutely con-
vergent):
Vm = aα
m−1
λm
e−αθ
∞∑
k=m
λk
kαk
∞∑
$=k−m+1
α$θ$
$!
,
and substitute
∞∑
$=k−m+1
α$θ$
$!
= eαθ −
k−m∑
$=0
α$θ$
$!
to get
Vm = aα
m−1
λm
[
ln
(
1+ α
δ
)
−
m−1∑
k=1
λk
kαk
− e−αθ
∞∑
k=m
λk
kαk
k−m∑
$=0
α$θ$
$!
]
.
Transform the last term in the square bracket as we did to get for-
mula (14) to obtain formula (15).
A.2. Proof of Theorem 8
Expected reward of the first player. We aim to derive formula (27).
For simplicity, we start with the expected reward of the first
player, i.e. m = 0 in that formula. We remind the reader of nota-
tion (25), and we will use the extra notation
b = a1+pαp , and σm =
m∑
k=1
tk .
We remark that
bh1+p = x1
α
= (1+ p)x1 . (A.1)
Now, in formula (24), replace xα(tm) by its formula, taken again in
(24) but for t ∈ [tm−1, tm]. To take care of the possibility that zero
be reached, we introduce a notation for the positive part:
[[X]]+ = max{X , 0} .
We obtain
xα(t) = [[xα(tm−1)− αa[(m− 1)(tm − tm−1)+m(t − tm)]]]+ .
Iterate this process until expressing xα(t) in terms of xα(t1) and
finally use notation (16) to obtain
xα(t) = [[αa[h− (t2 − t1)− 2(t3 − t2)− · · ·
− (m− 1)(tm − tm−1)−m(t − tm)]]]+
= αa[[h+ σm −mt]]+ .
As a consequence,
Lm(τm, t) = b[[h+ σm −mt]]p+ . (A.2)
To keep the formulas readable, we use the notation (26).
We are now in a position to state the following fact:
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Proposition 2. For Lm given by (A.2) with (16), Mm as defined in (1)
is given by M1(t) = b[[h− t]]p+, and for m ≥ 2:
Mm(t) = b
Pp(m)
m∑
k=1
(−1)k−1
(m− k)!(k− 1)! [[h− k(t − t1)]]
p+m−1
+ . (A.3)
Proof. Observe that the formula is correct for m = 1. Then, we
need the simple lemma:
Lemma 2. Let a real number b, two real numbers u < v, and two
positive real numbers $ and r be given. Then∫ v
u
[[b+ $s]]r+ds =
1
$(r + 1)
(
[[b+ $v]]r+1+ − [[b+ $u]]r+1+
)
.
Proof of the lemma. If b+ $v ≤ 0, then clearly the integrand is
always zero, thus so is the integral, as well as our right hand side
(r.h.s.). If b+ $u ≥ 0, the integrand is always positive, as well as the
two terms of the r.h.s. This is a simple integration. If u < −$/b < v ,
we should integrate from −$/b to v. Then the lower bound corre-
sponds to b+ $s = 0, and we only have the term corresponding to
the upper bound, which is what our r.h.s. gives. !
We use the following representation of Mm:
Mm(t) =
∫ t
t1
dtm
∫ tm
t1
dtm−1
∫ tm−1
t1
dtm−2 . . .
∫ t3
t1
[[h+ σm −mt]]p+dt2 .
To carry out this calculation, we introduce, for m ≥ 2 the kernel
Km(tm, t) = 1
Pp(m− 1)
m−1∑
k=1
(−1)k−1
(m− k− 1)!(k− 1)!
×[h+ kt1 + (m− k)tm −mt]p+m−2, (A.4)
and the quantity
Nm(tm+1, t) =
∫ tm+1
t1
Km(tm, t)dtm .
We first notice that M2 is obtained by taking the positive parts
of all terms in bN2(t, t). To get M3(t) we may simply replace ev-
erywhere h by h+ t3 − t, which behaves as a constant in previous
integrations, integrate in t3 from t1 to t, and take the positive parts
of all terms. And so on. It remains to derive the general forms of
Km and Nm by induction. Let us start from the formula given for
Km. Integrating, we get
Nm(tm+1, t)
= Pp(m)−1
m−1∑
k=1
(−1)k−1
(m−k)!(k−1)!
×[(h+kt1+(m−k)tm+1−mt)p+m−1−(h+mt1−mt)p+m−1].
The second term in the r.h.s. is independent from k. Recognizing
combinatorial coefficients, and using (1+ (−1))m−1 = 0, we get
m−1∑
k=1
(−1)k
(m− k)!(k− 1)! =
−1
(m− 1)!
m−2∑
k=0
(−1)k
(
m− 1
k
)
= (−1)
m−1
(m− 1)! ,
which we can include as the term k = m of the sum, leading to
Nm(tm+1, t) = 1
Pp(m)
m∑
k=1
(−1)k−1
(m− k)!(k− 1)!
×[h+ kt1 − (m− k)tm+1 −mt]m.
Taking the positive part of each term in (a2/2)Nm(t, t) yields for-
mula (A.3), and adding tm+1 − t to all terms yields formula analo-
gous to (A.4) for Km+1, proving the proposition. !
We therefore have
V1 = b
∞∑
m=1
λm−1
Pp(m)
m∑
k=1
(−1)k−1
(m− k)!(k− 1)!
×
∫ h+t1
t1
[[h− k(t − t1)]]p+m−1+ e−λ(t−t1)dt
= b
∞∑
m=1
λm−1
Pp(m)
m∑
k=1
(−1)k−1
(m− k)!(k− 1)!
∫ h/k
0
(h− kt)p+m−1e−λtdt.
Using the power expansion of exp(−λt), and then successive inte-
grations by parts, we find∫ h/k
0
(h− kt)p+m−1e−λtdt =
∞∑
$=0
∫ h/k
0
(h− kt)p+m−1 (−λt)
$
$!
dt
= θ p+m
∞∑
$=0
(−λh)$
k$+1
m+$∏
i=m
(p+ i)−1 .
We substitute this expression in the formula for Mm(t), regroup
powers of λh and products p+ i:
V1 = bh
p
λ
∞∑
m=1
m∑
k=1
(−1)k+m−1
(m− k)!(k− 1)!
∞∑
$=m
(−λh)$
k$−m+1Pp($+ 1) .
We take a factor λh out, change the order of summation and use
(A.1) to find
V1 = x1
∞∑
$=1
q$−1
Pp+1($)
$∑
m=1
m∑
k=1
(−1)m+k
(m− k)! k! k$−m .
Finally, let n = $−m+ k replace m as a summation index. We ob-
tain:
V1 = x1
∞∑
$=1
q$−1
Pp+1($)
$∑
n=1
(−1)$−n
($− n)!
n∑
k=1
1
k! kn−k
. (A.5)
which is formula (27) with m = 0. !
Expected reward of later players. We focus on the reward of the
m+ 1-st arrived player, i.e. when m players are already present.
We seek now to instantiate formula (10) with m = n+ 1. Let
xm+1 = x(tm+1) , θm+1 =
xαm+1
αa
and σ $m+1 = σ$ − σm .
We easily obtain
Lm+n = b
[[
θm+1 + σm+nm+1 −m(t − tm+1)− (m+ n)t
]]p
+ .
An analysis completely parallel to the previous one leads to
Mm+nm+1 =
b
Pp(n)
n∑
k=1
(−1)k−1
(n− k)!(k− 1)! [[θm+1 − (m+ k)(t − tm+1)]]
p+n−1
+ .
Using the similarity with formula (A.3), we get formula (27):
Vm+1 = xm+1
∞∑
$=1
q$−1
Pp+1($)
$∑
n=1
(−1)$−n
($− n)!
n∑
k=1
1
k!(m+ k)n−k .
as desired. !
Appendix B. Simple sharing and the evolution of fungal plant
parasites
The “Simple sharing” example may fit biotrophic fungal plant
parasites such as cereal rusts. These fungi travel as airborne spores.
When falling on a plant, a spore may germinate and the fungus
may penetrate the plant tissue. Such an infection results in a very
small (say 1 mm2 large) lesion. After a latent period during which
the fungus takes up the products of the plant host’s photosynthe-
sis, the lesion starts releasing a new generation of spores.
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There may be hundreds of lesions (foragers) on the same plant
(patch). Each lesion was created following the random arrival of
a spore, which may be modeled as a Poisson event of intensity
λ. The lesions may remain active until host death (which may be
modeled as a Poisson event of intensity δ) or the end of the sea-
son (t = T ). In other words, it is reasonable to assume that no le-
sion (forager) stops exploiting the plant (patch) before the others.
Under this assumption, the individual uptake rate of the resource
cannot increase.
Besides, the number of spores produced per unit time per le-
sion has been shown to reach a plateau after a sufficient number of
lesions occur on the same leaf in e.g. Puccinia graminis, the wheat
stem rust fungus (see [21, Fig. 2]). This indicates that there is a
maximum resource flow that can be extracted from the host and
shared among the lesions. This is likely due to the fact that lesions
share the same flow of photosynthates and other nutrients pro-
vided daily by the plant. Hence the fit with the “Simple sharing”
example.
The latent period may be genetically determined, as in e.g. Puc-
cinia triticina, the fungal pathogen causing leaf rust on wheat [30].
Moreover, there is evidence for a positive correlation between the
latent period and the number of spores produced per unit time per
unit area of sporulating tissue in e.g. P. triticina [22] (see also [14]
for a similar trade-off in a different species). Such a trade-off is ex-
plained by the fact that shorter latent periods provide less time for
the fungus to take up resources from the host, which results in the
production of fewer spores [30].
Since the latent period corresponds to a period during which
the parasite takes up the host’s resources before it can travel to
a new host, it is analogous to the patch residence time in for-
aging theory. In addition, host resources diverted by the fungus
are converted into spores (offspring) i.e. into fitness. Consequently,
one may wonder what is the optimal latent period given that the
longer the latent period, the greater the fitness accumulated prior
to departure and infection of a new host.
Let θ be the mean travel time of a spore. Let L be the latent pe-
riod. Following the above analogy with optimal foraging theory, we
define an optimal (or evolutionarily stable) latent period as maxi-
mizing the following fitness measure (per unit time):
F (L) = W (L)
θ + L ,
where W is the fitness accumulated by a single lesion averaged
over all possible arrival ranks:
W (L) = EmVm(L) ,
with e.g., for m = 1,
V1(L) = a
∫ L
0
e−δt
1− e−λt
λt
dt .
after Theorem 3. More specifically, letting M = m(T ) being the to-
tal number of lesions on the patch at the end of the season (a
Poisson-distributed random variable), we may write:
W (L) = EM
[
1
M
M∑
m=1
Vm(L)
]
,
assuming that each rank of arrival is equiprobable (short latent pe-
riods confer no advantage in terms of arrival rank), with probabil-
ity 1/M. Hence,
W (L) =
∞∑
M=1
e−λT
(λT )M
M!
[
1
M
M∑
m=1
Vm(L)
]
,
Performing the maximization using one of the formulas for Vm(L)
is left for a future paper, but it can be conjectured that W (L) is in-
creasing, concave and differentiable for all L so that a classical op-
timal foraging argument holds: there is a unique L* which corre-
sponds to the point where the tangent of W (L) passes through the
point (−θ ,0). Hence the greater the mean travel time of a spore,
the greater the optimal latent period.
An open question left is whether increasing λ (higher infections
frequency) results in decreasing the optimal latent period, as can
be expected.
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